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This article develops a search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining, and employers’ taste discrimi-
nation in which—under necessary but standard distributional assumption—it is possible to separately identify gender
discrimination and unobserved productivity differences. The equilibrium shows that both prejudiced and unprejudiced
employers wage discriminate. Maximum likelihood estimates on CPS data indicate that half of the employers are prej-
udiced, average female productivity is 6.5% lower, and two-third of the gender earning differential may be explained
by prejudice. An afﬁrmative action policy is implemented resulting in a redistribution of welfare from men to women
at no cost for employers’ welfare.
1. INTRODUCTION
Gender differentials in the labor market are widespread and persistent2: Even if wages and
earnings for women and men in the United States have experienced a signiﬁcant convergence
in the 1970s and 1980s, their ratio has remained roughly constant at 75% since the mid-1990s
(Blau and Kahn, 2004; Eckstein and Nagypal, 2004). The United States is not an exception
among OECD countries: they rank more or less average, with Northern European countries
traditionally showing the lowest differentials and Japan the highest. These differentials persist
after conditioning on observable productivity characteristics, and the consensus in the literature
is that a signiﬁcant portion of the conditional differential remains “unexplained.”
This type of evidence, together with employment differentials and segregation by industry
and occupation, has long been considered a possible indication of prejudice against women in
the labor market. However, the observables used to proxy productivity are not an exhaustive
description of actual productivity, and, as a result, there is no conclusive evidence on whether
gender differentials are due to labor market discrimination or to unobserved productivity dif-
ferences. The issue can be interpreted as an identiﬁcation problem: We systematically observe
an empirical evidence for which there are competing explanations. One explanation involves
prejudice and discrimination, the other differences in workers’ behavior, productivity, and pref-
erences.
The contribution of this article is to develop a model of the labor market that allows for
discrimination and to show that, using the model and standard distributional assumptions, it
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is possible to separately identify discrimination from unobserved productivity differences. This
identiﬁcation strategy is then implemented. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood
using data from the 1995 Current Population Survey (CPS). The point estimates are used to
decompose the contribution of discrimination and other sources of heterogeneity to the overall
labor market gender differential and to perform policy experiments.
The model developed in the article posits a labor market characterized by search frictions
and employer discrimination in the form of taste discrimination. Taste discrimination is prob-
ably the most prominent theory of prejudiced behavior, and its incorporation within a search
model of labor market dynamic has already been suggested as a promising way to study the
issue (Heckman, 1998; Altonji and Blank, 1999) In the model, there are four types of agents:
two types of workers (male and female) and two types of employers (prejudiced and unprej-
udiced). Workers search for jobs and employers post vacancies. Upon meeting, they observe
a match-speciﬁc value of productivity and engage in bargaining to determine wages; matching
and bargaining generate spillover effects. These effects represent a crucial channel of the trans-
mission of prejudiced behavior on labor market outcomes that has not been captured by the
previous applied literature. Spillover effects imply that the existence of a positive proportion
of prejudiced employers lowers women’s outside option; as a result, women experience wage





and Heckman, 1982) and the added value here is that the same restriction is enough to also
identify discrimination. The identiﬁcation strategy exploits a distinctive feature of the observed
earnings distribution of women with respect to men: Female earnings are more concentrated in
the left tail and the density to the left of the mode is quite ﬂat.3 The model also generates this
difference in shape because the observed female earnings distribution is a mixture between two
earnings distributions: one composed by women working for unprejudiced employers and the
other by women working for prejudiced employers.
The estimates are obtained by maximum likelihood using data from the 1995 CPS. CPS has
beenchosenbecausethisallowsfordisaggregationbyrelativelyhomogenoussubgroupsandthe
year1995becauseitisinthemiddleofaperiodofrelativestabilityofgenderdifferentials.Results
show that both discrimination and productivity differences are present in the labor market for
white college graduates. Average female productivity is estimated to be about 6.5% lower than
male productivity, and explicit prejudice is estimated to involve about half of the employers.
Using these estimated structural parameters, it is possible to decompose the observed earnings
differential, taking into account equilibrium effects. The resulting decomposition shows that
prejudice is the most important factor in explaining the differential but that productivity also
plays a signiﬁcant role. Prejudice is able to generate up to two-thirds of the observed earnings
differential, whereas differences in productivity generate up to one-third.
I also consider the scope for Afﬁrmative Action policies. I ﬁrst show that an afﬁrmative
action policy implemented as a quota system has no impact under the parameter estimates,
becauseasigniﬁcantproportionofwomenarealreadyhiredinthepre-policyequilibrium.Ithen
implement an afﬁrmative action policy deﬁned as an employer’s subsidy for hiring women. The
policy generates a redistribution of welfare from men to women without signiﬁcantly changing
employers’ welfare.
Although a large literature shares the same objective as this article, very few implement
a similar approach. The main example is Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), an equilibrium search
3 See Figures 1 and 2, below. The literature usually focuses on differences in means, but this difference in shape is
quite general and it is not speciﬁc to the year and sample used here. For example a similar shape is found on CPS data
for 1985 and 2005 (the ﬁrst and last year on which a similar sample can be extracted), and a similar pattern can be
implied from the empirical cumulative density functions in Bowlus (1997) on data from NLSY.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 747
model with employer’s taste discrimination against black workers. Their results indicate that
the importance of productivity differences in explaining race wage differentials is signiﬁcantly
reducedwhenexplicitdiscriminationisconsidered.However,thefocusoftheirpaperismoreon
proposing an identiﬁcation strategy than on providing reliable estimates. As a result, maximum
likelihoodestimationisnotapplicableandtheestimatesarenotrobustwhenbothdiscrimination
andproductivitydifferencesareassumed.Inthisrespect,myarticlehastheadvantageofobtain-
ing maximum likelihood estimates by adopting a different identiﬁcation strategy. This comes
at the theoretical cost of assuming an exogenous distribution of match-speciﬁc productivity.
Nonetheless, the bargaining structure that I am considering in the model adds new equilibrium
effects that turn out to be quite relevant.
Two other prominent examples in a similar line of research are Eckstein and Wolpin (1999)
and Bowlus (1997). Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) use the bargaining structure in a search model
to obtain bounds on the amount of racial discrimination. However, the bounds they obtain
on 1979 NLSY data turn out to not be informative. Bowlus (1997) is the only contribution in
the related search literature focusing on gender differentials. However, she does not allow for
discrimination, thus estimating large differences in unobserved productivity between men and
women. As the author acknowledges, unobserved productivity is forced in her model to explain
all the residual differential in wages.
Withrespecttothegeneralliteratureondiscrimination,itisworthnoticingthatonlyoneofthe
two possible theories of discrimination is allowed in the model: taste discrimination (Becker,
1971). The alternative theory, statistical discrimination,4 is ruled out by the fact that match-
speciﬁc productivity is common knowledge to both the worker and the employer. Removing
this restriction would make the model impossible to identify, but the “ spillover effects” present
in the model share a similar mechanism with the standard statistical discrimination theory: In
equilibrium, group characteristics affect individual level wage schedules. Recent applications
of statistical discrimination to gender labor market differentials are Gayle and Golan (2008)
and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009). Interestingly, Gayle and Golan (2008) estimate an impact of
discrimination on wage differential of a magnitude similar to that found in this article.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and its main implications.
Section 3 describes the data and the procedure to extract the estimation sample. Section 4
derivesthelikelihoodfunctionandtheidentiﬁcationstrategy.Section5reportsanddiscussesthe
estimationresults.Section6containsthepolicyexperimentsbasedontheestimatedparameters.
Section 7 discusses some major limitations of the article and proposes future research. Finally,
Section 8 summarizes the main conclusions.
2. THE MODEL
The search model with matching and bargaining used in this article is a fairly standard frame-
workusedtostudylabormarketdynamics.5 Itisatractableimprovementonpartialequilibrium
job search models, allowing for a wider range of equilibrium effects once major policy or struc-
turalchangesareintroduced.Search–matching–bargainingmodelshavebeenestimatedtostudy
a variety of issues, such as duration to ﬁrst job and returns to schooling (Eckstein and Wolpin,
1995), race discrimination (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999), and the impact of mandatory minimum
wage (Flinn, 2006).
A theory of taste discrimination was ﬁrst proposed by Gary Becker in 1957 (last published as
Becker,1971)Theideaistorelateprejudicedbehaviortopreferencesthateconomicagentsmay
have with respect to clearly identiﬁed groups. Taste discrimination is still the most widespread,
albeit debated, theory of prejudiced behavior, and search models are a promising way to
4 Arrow (1973) and Phelps (1972). A recent application using an interesting way to identify statistical discrimination
by imposing model restrictions is Moro (2003).
5 Jovanovic (1979) gives theoretical foundation to the importance of match-speciﬁc productivity in explaining labor
market dynamics. Flinn and Heckman (1982) provide the basic theory for identiﬁcation.748 FLABBI
extend Becker’s theory of discrimination because the monopsony power induced by search fric-
tions generate positive proﬁts. Some employers can then choose to “indulge” in their prejudice
according to their preferences (Heckman, 1998), generating the persistent discrimination that
we seem to observe (Altonji and Blank, 1999).
2.1. Environment. The model is in continuous time, populated by four types of agents
inﬁnitely lived: two types of workers (men and women) and two types of employers (prejudiced
and unprejudiced). The proportion of prejudiced employers is indicated with p and the propor-
tion of male workers is denoted by m, and they are both common knowledge to all the agents.
Workers meet employers following a Poisson process with an instantaneous rate of arrival λ.
The search process is random,6 and there is no on-the-job search. Once an employer and a
worker meet, they observe a match-speciﬁc productivity value (x), modeled as a draw from an
exogenous distribution denoted by the cdf G. Once a match is formed, it can be terminated
following a Poisson process at an instantaneous rate η.
Wages are determined through wage bargaining between employers and workers upon ob-
serving the match value and their types. Workers’ utility functions are linear in wages and no
disutility from working is assumed. While unemployed, workers receive an instantaneous util-
ity (or disutility) ﬂow b. The last exogenous common knowledge parameter in the model is a
discount rate ρ, assumed to be the same for employers and workers.
The workers’ type is deﬁned by an observable characteristic (gender) that induces a different
behaviorintheemployertheworkerismeeting.Thetwogroupsofworkersmayalsohaveexante
differences in some of the fundamental parameters that explain the labor market dynamic such
asthearrivalrateandtheproductivitydistribution.Inthetheoreticalpresentationofthemodel,
though, the productivity distribution and all the exogenous transition rates are assumed to be
the same for the two groups. This “ homogenous” formulation allows for a concise presentation
of the model. It also shows that the presence of prejudiced employers is enough to replicate
the descriptive empirical evidence we observe. Heterogeneity will then be introduced in the
empirical section to estimate speciﬁcations that include both prejudice and gender differentials
in productivity and behavior.
The employers’ type is deﬁned by a difference in preferences: prejudiced employers receive
a disutility ﬂow (d) from hiring women (Becker, 1971). Employers maximize utility, there are
constant returns to scale, and labor is the only factor of production. Therefore, the total output
at a given employer is the sum of the productivity levels (x) of all his/her matched employees.
Employersearnnorevenuesbutmakenopaymentifamatchisnotrealized;thereforethevalue
of their outside option is zero.
2.2. Value Functions. Unprejudiced and prejudiced employers are denoted by I = N, P,
and male and female workers are denoted by J = M,W. The detailed derivation of the value
functions is presented in Appendix A1 whereas in the following only a brief description of them
is provided. The value of employment for a worker of type J working at an employer of type I





Equation (1) states that the value of employment is the current instantaneous value of the
state for the worker (wJI(x)) plus the value of the other possible state (unemployment, UJ)
weighted by the probability associated to this event (η), all appropriately discounted by the
instantaneous rates ρ and η.
6 It may seem more realistic to introduce directed search in this context, as, for example, in Mailath et al. (2000).
However,thefocusofthearticleisontheempiricalpredictionofthemodel,and,giventhedataathand,itdoesnotmake
an identiﬁable difference to assume exogenously different arrival rates, as it is done in the empirical implementation of
themodel,ortomodeldirectedsearchbehavior.Noticethattherateofarrivalofoffersfromthetwotypesofemployers
is allowed to be different because the proportion of the two types of employers is not necessarily the same.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 749
Whileunemployed,apotentialworkerreceivesinstantaneous(dis)utilityfromunemployment
(b), and, as a result of the search activity, three main events may happen: not meeting any ﬁrm,
meeting a prejudiced employer, or meeting an unprejudiced employer. By stationarity and by
the Poisson processes governing meetings and terminations, the value of unemployment for a
worker of type J is then given by




max[WJ [wJP(x)] − UJ,0]dG(x)
+ (1 − p)
 




Equation (2) shows that the value of unemployment is constant with respect to wages and has
the usual interpretation: The reservation wage should compensate the state of unemployment
with expected gains from matching with a prejudiced or an unprejudiced employer.
These two value functions show that the optimal decision rule will have a reservation value
property: Because the value of employment is increasing in w, whereas the value of unemploy-
ment is constant in w, a reservation wage w∗ will exist such that WJ [w∗
J] = ρUJ. However, the
next section will show that wages are a monotone function of the match-speciﬁc productivity x,
and therefore the relevant type-speciﬁc reservation values will be deﬁned over x.
2.3. Wages. When employers and workers meet, the value of the match and the types are
fully revealed. Common knowledge of the matching value is the usual practice in these models,
and it rules out the possibility of statistical discrimination.
Wages are determined by bargaining upon observing the match-speciﬁc productivity and the
types. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution is assumed, and therefore wage schedules are
determined by choosing a wage that maximizes the product of the surplus in the match of the
two agents, weighted by their relative bargaining power coefﬁcient. The workers’ surplus is
given by the difference between the value of accepting the job, WJ(wJI), and the value of the
alternative, UJ. The employer’s surplus is given by the discounted proﬁt plus, in the case of
prejudiced employers, the disutility from hiring women.




[w − ρUJ]α[x − dI{W,P} − w](1−α)
ρ + η
 
=⇒wJI(x,UJ) = α (x − dI{W,P}) + (1 − α)ρUJ,
(3)
where I{W,P} is an indicator function equal to one when the worker is female (J = W) and the
employer prejudiced (I = P). A behavioral interpretation of this solution is that it is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium of the basic alternating offer game over dividing the surplus, in
continuoustime.Underthisinterpretation,thecommondiscountvalueforalltheagentsimplies
that also the bargaining power coefﬁcients are the same,7 that is, α = 1/2.
In terms of agents’ types, four matches are possible: men with prejudiced or unprejudiced
employers and women with prejudiced or unprejudiced employers. The corresponding wage
schedules can be obtained from Equation (3).
A man matched with an unprejudiced or a prejudiced employer, I = N, P, will receive
wMI(x,UM) = αx + (1 − α)ρUM. (4)
The ﬁrst line of Equation (4) states that the wage of a realized match should guarantee the
worker the reservation value ρUM plus a portion α of the total surplus of the match, that is,
7 See Binmore et al. (1986) and Binmore (1987).750 FLABBI
(x − ρUM). Note that the wage schedule is independent of the employer’s type and induces a
reservation value on the productivity of the match. This is the truly relevant reservation value,
becausebothreservationwagesandreservationproﬁtsdependonthematchproductivityvalue.
The match reservation value is such that WM[wMJ(x∗
MJ,UM)] = UM and πJM(x∗
JM,UM) = 0.
Using (1)–(3), it is determined to be
x∗
MJ = x∗
JM= ρUM =⇒ w∗
MJ = ρUM.
This is the value above which both the employer and the worker agree to enter the match. This
nondisagreement result is an implication of the Nash bargaining assumption as shown by the
ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem in Equation (3).
A woman matched with an unprejudiced or a prejudiced employer, I = N, P, will receive
wWI(x,UW) = α (x − dI{W,P}) + (1 − α)ρUW. (5)
Equation (5) has the same interpretation of Equation (4), but now the wage schedule depends
ontheemployer’stype.Matchingwithaprejudicedemployerswillshiftdownthewageschedule,
thus creating wage discrimination with respect to women working for an unprejudiced employ-
ers. Proposition 1 will prove that also wage discrimination with respect to men is present due





IW = ρUW + dI{W,P} =⇒ w∗
WJ = ρUW.
Therefore, even if the reservation wage is the same for all the female workers, the reservation
productivity value is higher for women matched with prejudiced employers. A woman is more
picky to accept a job from a prejudiced than from an unprejudiced employer. She will accept,
though, if the value of the match is high enough because wages are increasing in productivity.
A symmetric argument holds for the prejudiced employer because proﬁts also are increasing in
productivity.8
2.4. Equilibrium and Model Implications. Using Equations (1), (2), and (3), the values of














, J = M,W.
(6)
The equilibrium is therefore deﬁned as
DEFINITION 1. Given a vector (λ,η,ρ,b,α,d, p) and a probability distribution function for
productivity of match values G(x), an equilibrium is a vector of values of unemployment U∗ =
(U∗
M,U∗
W) that solves Equations (6) for J = M,W. The equilibrium vectorU∗ determines all the
reservation values that constitute each agent’s decision rules.
An important implication of this equilibrium concerns the value of unemployment for the
two types of workers. What we expect is a lower value of unemployment for women because a
8 Notice also that when female workers have all the bargaining power (α = 1), they pay all the cost of discrimination
as measured by the disutility d. If this is the case, a complete segregation result is likely to occur.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 751
positive measure of prejudiced employers worsens their perspectives in the labor market. This
result is stated in the following proposition.9
PROPOSITION 1. For any equilibrium previously deﬁned such that 0 < p ≤ 1 and d > 0, the
value of unemployment for women is lower than for men, that is,
UW < UM. (7)
The main empirical motivation of the labor market discrimination debate is the presence of
gender differentials in unconditional or conditional means of some measure of wages. These
differentials should proxy different wage rates for equally productive workers. Different wages
atsameproductivityistheusualdeﬁnitionofwagediscrimination.Afurtherempiricalevidence
that is often considered is segregation, deﬁned as the concentration of minority workers in
relatively few sectors of the economy. It is useful to deﬁne both concepts within the model to
clarify the implications of the equilibrium for the empirical evidence.
DEFINITION 2. In the economy deﬁned earlier, workers’ type J suffers wage discrimination
with respect to workers’ type J  if and only if they are paid a lower wage conditioning on same
productivity, that is,
wJI(x) − wJ I(x) < 0 for any productivity value x.
DEFINITION 3. In the economy deﬁned earlier, complete segregation means that all workers
of type J work for employers of type I; partial segregation means that workers of type J work in
higher proportion for employers of type I.
Using these deﬁnitions and Proposition 1 is possible to study the equilibrium effects of prej-
udice on employers that are not prejudiced showing that prejudice and wage discrimination
are two separate concepts, even if they quite often overlap. Wage discrimination may simply
be a best response in a given environment, without any implication in terms of preferences.
Moreover, wage discrimination disjoint from prejudice has different policy implications than
a situation in which wage discrimination and prejudice coincide. In this respect, an interest-
ing case described by the model is the behavior of unprejudiced employers that discriminate
against women because the presence of prejudiced employers worsens the bargaining position
of women. This situation is summarized in the following deﬁnition.
DEFINITION 4. In the economy deﬁned earlier, spillover effects means that the presence of
prejudiced employers induces wage discrimination also at unprejudiced employers, that is,
wJN(x) − wJ N(x) < 0 for any productivity value x.
It is now possible to summarize the implications of the model with respect to the descriptive
evidenceongenderdifferentialsinthelabormarket.Theevidencecanbesummarizedas(i)male
average earnings higher than female average earnings and (ii) some degree of concentration
of women in some sectors and occupations, that is, partial but not complete segregation. These
implications can be directly derived from Proposition 1 as shown in Appendix A2.
Notice that wage differentials in the model arise from two channels. First, women working for
a prejudiced employers will be paid less than a men equally productive. Second, the presence of
a positive proportion of prejudiced employers implies in equilibrium a lower value of entering
the labor market for women. This value is proportional to the threat point of women while
bargaining with any employer. Therefore, even when working for an unprejudiced employer,
9 All the proofs are in Appendix A2.752 FLABBI
women will receive lower wages at the same level of productivity because they are less able to
extract rent when bargaining for wages.10
The relevant question is now empirical: How important is the impact of prejudice when
other sources of heterogeneity are present? In particular, if men and women differs in ex ante
productivity and search behavior, to what extent is prejudice still a major factor in explaining
gender differentials in the labor market? The result depends on parameter values, and the
objective of the estimation section is to obtain these values for a representative sample of U.S.
workers. Notice also that the structure of the model may offer a different and richer reading
of the empirical evidence. For example, estimating a conditional mean wage differential may
overestimate prejudice because also unprejudiced employers wage-discriminate women; on the





description of the Survey and the sample extraction procedure can be found in Appendix A3.
CPS has been chosen because it is a very large nationally representative sample that permits
disaggregation by relatively homogenous subgroups. The year 1995 was chosen because it is in
the middle of a period of relative stability of gender differentials in the labor market.11
Individuals in the estimation sample satisfy the following criteria:
 30–55 years old (extremes included);
 employed or looking for a job;
 classiﬁed as white; and
 holding a college degree or more.
These selection criteria are introduced to guarantee a degree of homogeneity in the sample.
In the model, workers are assumed to be homogenous with the only exception being gender.
Selecting a sample homogenous with respect to some observables correlated with performance
in the labor market is a minimum requirement for a meaningful empirical application. Some
justiﬁcation about the homogeneity controls is provided in Appendix A3.
The observed labor market variable used to estimate the likelihood contribution of unem-
ployed individuals is the individual unemployment duration. No wage information for unem-
ployed individuals is available. The ﬁnal sample contains 49 unemployed individuals, 28 women
and 21 men. Some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Women have on average lower
unemployment duration but a higher unemployment rate.12 The mean and standard deviation
of unemployment durations are roughly equal, an indication that the exponential distribution
implied by the model is not inconsistent with the data.
The labor market variable observed for employed individuals is earning at the date of the
interview. Earnings are recorded before deductions, and, conditioning on the homogeneity
controls, the sample contains 1,031 women and 1,244 men with valid observations on hourly
earnings. Some descriptive statistics are in the top panel of Table 1.
10 Some episodic evidence is consistent with this interpretation. A typical example is the academic job market (Blau
and Kahn, 2000).
11 For example, Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) assess the U.S. labor market dynamic over 1961–2002 using CPS, and
they show that the female-to-male wage ratio has increased substantially from the mid-1970 to the early 1990, starting
to ﬂuctuate after the late 1990. Blau and Kahn (2000) show a signiﬁcant convergence in the 1970 and 1980, with the
ratio increasing from about 60% to about 75%, and then a substantial stability at this level during the 1990.
12 Bowlus (1997), using a sample from NLSY, ﬁnds higher unemployment durations for women. This difference may
be due to cohort effects and to the inclusion of transitions from nonparticipation. The participation rate differential for
the demographic group considered in this article is not too high: 96.8% for men and 85.2% for women.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 753
TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample Moments NP (i U) E(wi |i E) SD(wi |i E) E(ti |i U) SD(ti |i U)
Without trimming
All 2,324 0.0211 19.16 9.51 4.53 4.13
Women 1,059 0.0264 16.78 8.46 3.72 3.33
Men 1,265 0.0166 21.13 9.87 5.59 4.88
Women/men
ratio 0.837 1.590 0.794 0.857 0.665 0.682
With trimming
All 2,213 0.0226 19.89 9.16 4.53 4.13
Women 1,009 0.0277 17.41 8.17 3.72 3.33
Men 1,204 0.0174 21.94 9.44 5.59 4.88
Women/men
ratio 0.838 1.592 0.794 0.865 0.665 0.682
NOTE: Data extracted from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (March Supplement) of the
CPS for the year 1995. Variables deﬁnition: ti is the monthly unemployment duration; wiis the hourly
earnings in dollars; i U is the individual i is unemployed; i E is the individual i is employed.
The CPS data include reports of extremely low earnings that may suggest the presence of
underreporting: I have therefore chosen to trim the low tail of the two earnings distributions.13
Theamountoftrimmingimpliesatrade-off:Themoreobservationsaredeleted,thehigheristhe
probability of deleting unrealistically low wages but the higher is the distortion of the earnings
distribution, in particular of the female distribution, where many observations are clustered in
thelowtail.ThecompromiseIhavereachedistodropthebottom5%,computingthepercentile
separately on the male and female earning distributions. The 5% percentile is a standard cutoff
point(see,e.g.,Bowlus,1997)andgeneratesminimumearningsequalto5.75dollarsperhourfor
women and to 7.175 dollars per hour for men. As will be clear from the identiﬁcation strategy,
theestimationofreservationvaluesisverysensitivetothiscutoffpoint.However,theestimation
of the other relevant parameters is not as shown in the estimation section.
A second issue of CPS data is the presence of topcoding of income and earning variables. For
mysample,topcodingonhourlyearningsisbindingonlyonﬁveobservationswhiletopcodingon
weekly earnings involves 122 observations. The main problem of topcoding for the estimation
of the model is the distortion of the shape of the observed earnings distribution due to the
mass points that topcoding naturally generates. Variation in hours worked reduces the impact
of topcoding on weekly earnings, generating an empirical earnings distribution with only three
mass points of about a dozen observations for men and one mass point for women (Figures 1
and 2) implying a negligible impact on the estimation results.
The sample used for estimation is reported in the lower panel of Table 1. The earning dif-
ferential is basically unchanged by the trimming: The female-to-male earnings ratio is 79.4%, a
valueconsistentwithdataonrepresentativesamplesfortheUnitedStates.14 Thisratioisslightly
higher than the one for the whole population: Using CPS, the ratio is 77.07% over the entire la-
bor force and 74.53% over whites in the same age range. Male earnings have an higher standard
deviation,mainlybecausefemaleearningstendtobemoreclusteredinthelefttail.Theempirical
13 An alternative solution is to explicitly allow for measurement errors in earnings. However, this does not seem the
appropriate solution for this speciﬁc problem. Allowing for measurement errors in earnings usually has the advantage
of taking into account probability-zero events observed in the sample, for example, job-to-job transitions associated
with a wage loss in an on-the-job search model (Wolpin, 1987; Flinn, 2002a). This advantage will be absent here, and the
efﬁciency cost of adding measurement errors seems higher than the beneﬁt of keeping these unrealistically low earnings
in the sample.
14 Bowlus (1997) uses NLSY on white college graduates and ﬁnds a ratio equal to 0.815 on weekly wages. Without
controlling for race, Eckstein and Nagypal (2004) use the annual wages and salary earnings for full-time full-year
workers from CPS 1995 and compute a ratio equal to 0.662 on college graduates between the ages of 22 and 65. Without
controlling for race, Blau (1998) uses weekly wage for full-time workers on CPS 1994 and ﬁnds a ratio equal to 0.736
on those 35–44 years old with 16 years of education or more.754 FLABBI
FIGURE 1
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earnings distributions reported in Figures 1 and 2 reveals this clear difference in shape: Female
earnings are highly concentrated between the minimum wage and 20 dollar per hour. Also, the
slopes of the two densities are quite different: The female density is relatively ﬂat between the
truncation point and the mode (in particular if we ignore the spikes due to rounding) and then
decreases quite fast after 20 dollar per hour; the male density increases between the truncation
point and the mode and smoothly decreases after the 15/20 dollar per hour level.
4. IDENTIFICATION
The CPS sample can be described as a vector
 
{wi}i EJ ;{ti}i UJ
 
J=M,W where wi are hourly
earnings,ti areon-goingunemploymentdurationsmeasuredinmonths, EJ isthesetofemployed
individuals of gender J, and UJ is the set of unemployed individuals of gender J.
4.1. LikelihoodFunction. InthetheoreticalmodelpresentedinSection2,menandwomen
are identical if no prejudice is present. In the empirical speciﬁcation, however, it is important
to also allow for productivity differences between men and women. Productivity differences
are introduced by allowing the parameters of the productivity distribution to differ by gender.
Otherbehavioraldifferencesarecapturedbygender-speciﬁcarrivalrates,terminationrates,and
instantaneous values of unemployment. These describe differences in the intensity of search or
in other behaviors related to the labor market search process in a reduced form fashion. The
subscript J = M,W isusedtodenotethesedifferencesinparameterstogetherwiththenotation
I = N, P used to indicate employers’ heterogeneity.
Using Equations (4), (5), and (6), the model with both workers and employers heterogeneity
is summarized by four wage equations,
wJI = α(x − dI{W,P}) + (1 − α)ρUJ, (8)
and by two reservation wage equations,















where the corresponding cumulative distribution function for the density gJ(x) is indicated by
GJ(x) and the corresponding survival function by ˜ GJ(x).
Although the equilibrium of the model implies the same reservation wage at both employers
for each type of worker, the reservation match-value for women is higher when they meet
prejudiced employers than unprejudiced employers. Speciﬁcally, the difference between these
two reservation values is exactly equal to the intensity of discrimination d.
Thelikelihoodofasampleextractedfromthissteadystateequilibriumisgivenbythecontribu-
tionofunemployedandemployedindividuals.Inordertoobtainthecontributionofunemployed
individuals, consider the hazard rate out of unemployment:
hJ = λJ[(1 − p) ˜ GJ(ρUJ) + p ˜ GJ(ρUJ + dI{W})]. (10)
This constant hazard rate is implied by the time homogeneity of the environment, the Poisson
process that governs the arrival of job offers, and the optimal decision rule. It is given by two
components:thearrivalrateofoffersandtheprobabilitythatamatchisformedoncethemeeting
occurs. Therefore, men and women may have different hazard rates for exogenous reasons—
such as a different arrival rate—and for endogenous reasons—such as the equilibrium impact
of the presence of prejudice on the probability to accept the match. The environment implies756 FLABBI
that the unconditional unemployment contribution over on-going durations is the density of
an exponential random variable with coefﬁcient equal to the hazard rate times the steady-state
probability of unemployment:




, ti > 0.
(11)




takes into account that durations are observed
only for unemployed individuals. The complete derivation of the density (11) is presented in
Appendix A4.
The contribution of employed individuals is based on the mapping between wages and match
valuesreportedinEquation(8).Startingwiththeunconditionalcumulativedistributionfunction
of earnings, the contribution of employed individuals is derived from the optimal decision rules,
the parametric assumption on the match distribution, and ergodic results on ﬂows in and out
employment. This derivation, presented in Appendix A4, leads to the following contribution
for observed earnings:
fe(wi,w i >ρ UJ,i E| J)



















wi + αdI{W} − (1 − α)ρUJ
α
 







,w i >ρ UJ.
(12)
Based on these densities, the log-likelihood can be written as



















































wi + αd − (1 − α)ρUW
α
 












where wi and ti are observations on accepted wages and on-going unemployment durations,
  is the vector of parameters to be estimated, and NJ and NUJ denote the total number of
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FIGURE 3
DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF PRODUCTIVITY AND PREJUDICE ON THE ACCEPTED EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION
4.2. Identiﬁcation Results
4.2.1. Numerical example. An intuition of the most interesting component of the identi-
ﬁcation strategy, the separate identiﬁcation of productivity differences and prejudice, can be
given by analyzing whether a model with productivity differences and prejudice generates a
distinctively different distribution than a model with only productivity differences.15
In this example I will focus on the implied shape of the accepted wage distribution under
different model speciﬁcations. The values of the parameters used in this numerical exercise are
obtained by estimating the model with gender-speciﬁc parameters.16 The results are reported
in Figure 3. The top panel, labeled Productivity, shows the density of accepted wages under
no prejudice, that is, (p,d) = (0,0). The second panel shows the impact of prejudice: This





. The shape is now quite different, with the increasing part of the distribution
beforethetruncationpointalmostmissing.Itisaresultofthefactthatmatchesbetweenwomen
andprejudicedemployersareacceptableonlyatrelativelyhighproductivityvalues,thatis,when
x ≥ ρUW +  d.
15 The identiﬁcation is valid only conditioning on the functional form assumptions that will be discussed in the next
section. This numerical example, only has the objective of showing that productivity differences and prejudice have a
differential impact on observables once these assumptions are in place.
16 The productivity case is speciﬁcation (4) in Table 2, the full prejudice case is not reported in Table 2, and both the
productivity and prejudice case is speciﬁcation (6) in Table 2.758 FLABBI
When the proportion of prejudiced employers is not forced to be either one or zero, the ob-
served earning distribution is a mixture between earnings of workers employed at prejudiced
employers and earnings of workers employed at unprejudiced employers. This situation is re-
ported in the bottom panel of Figure 3, where (p,d) =
 
  p,  d
 
. The shape of the density is now
more similar to the top panel, but the low tail between the truncation point and the mode is
less steep. This is due to the mixture between the increasing density of women working for un-
prejudiced employers (top panel) and the decreasing density of women working for prejudiced
employers (second panel). With this mixture model, it is therefore possible to distort the distri-
bution of accepted wages in a different way than in a model with only productivity differences
or with full prejudice. The difference in shape between the top panel and the bottom panel is
intuitively what allows the identiﬁcation of (p,d) on top of (λW,η W,µ W,σ W).17
The comparison of Figures 1 and 2 shows that this is exactly the type of distortion that needs
to be explained in the data for women. The empirical distribution of women’s earnings with
respect to men has more mass on the left tail, but the slope out of the truncation point is actually
ﬂatter.
The degree of precision in estimating (p,d) depends on the density of women working at
unprejudiced employers and the density of women working at prejudiced employers being
well separated. The separation is entirely due to d whereas the proportion in the mixture is
entirely captured by p, generating a differential impact useful for their separate identiﬁcation.
An illustration of the different contribution of p and d to the observed wage distribution is
given in Figure 4. In the left column, p is ﬁxed at 0.5 and d is allowed to vary from 5 to 20;
in the right column, the disutility is ﬁxed at 15 and p changes from 0.1 to 0.9. The proportion
of prejudiced employers mainly affects the mode of the distribution: An increase in p (from
top to bottom panel of the right column) moves the mode to the left. The disutility d, instead,
marginally affects the mode but increasingly ﬂattens the distribution on the left of the mode (d
increases moving from top to bottom in the left column.) Therefore, out of the boundaries, the
two parameters have a sufﬁciently different impact to guarantee a rather precise estimation.
Some economic intuition behind the differential impact of p and d may be obtained by recalling
that the disutility parameter d has two impacts on the wage schedule (5): a direct impact on
wages of women working at prejudiced employer and an indirect impact through the outside
option ρUW on women working at both a prejudiced and unprejudiced employer. The second
impact is also shared by the proportion of prejudiced employers p, but only the ﬁrst impact adds
relatively more mass right above the reservation wage, contributing to ﬂatten the distribution
and generating the result illustrated in the example.
4.2.2. Formal discussion The set of parameters to be identiﬁed is denoted by  . Before
describing the identiﬁcation strategy it is useful to note the following ﬁve points.
First, I will only discuss here the hardest case to identify: complete heterogeneity between
men and women. Complete heterogeneitymeans that the only parametermen and women have
in common is the discount rate ρ.If identiﬁcation is proved under complete heterogeneity, then
it is also proved for speciﬁcations where men and women have some parameters in common.
Second, the Nash bargaining coefﬁcient α is a parameter notoriously difﬁcult to identify
without employer’s side information, as shown, for example, in Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) and
Flinn (2006). I will therefore not attempt to identify it, and I will apply a common solution in
applied work by setting this parameter to one half.18 Some behavioral foundation for this value
17 For completeness, recall that the reservation productivity value, that is, the lowest observed productivity, depends
on the environment. Speciﬁcally, in the top panel of Figure 3 (productivity) we have x∗ =   w∗; in the middle panel (full
prejudice) we have x∗ =   w∗ +  d; ﬁnally in the last panel (both prejudice and productivity) we are back to x∗ =   w∗
because a positive proportion of women meet unprejudiced employers. The numerical value ranges from 5.74 to 12.43.
18 See, for example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1993). Also Flinn and Heckman (1982), without explicitly assuming a
bargainingstructure,generateawageschedulethatcorrespondstosettingα = 1/2.Flinn(2006)estimatesthisparameter
for a sample of unskilled workers—therefore likely to have a lower coefﬁcient than the college educated workers of my
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IMPACT OF CHANGE IN DISUTILITY (LEFT PANEL) AND CHANGE IN PROPORTION OF PREJUDICED EMPLOYERS (RIGHT PANEL) ON THE
ACCEPTED EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION
results from assuming that a common discount rate is shared by workers and employers, leading
to symmetric Nash-bargaining (Binmore et al., 1986; Binmore, 1987).
Third, the structural parameters ρ and bJ enter the log-likelihood (13) only through the
reservation match-value ρUJ: They can therefore be only jointly identiﬁed and the model can
be reparametrized in terms of ρUJ since ρ and bJ can be recovered by the reservation wage
Equation (9).
Fourth,eveniftheprimitiveparameteristheexogenousarrivalrateλJ,wecanreparametrize
the model considering the hazard rate hJ as the parameter to be identiﬁed because the hazard
rate conditioning on the model is an invertible function of λJ as shown in Equation (10).
Fifth, a necessary condition for identiﬁcation is to assume a recoverable parametric distribu-
tion for the productivity-match distribution gJ (x).19 As will be explained later, to separately
identify prejudice and productivity differences, it is also necessary to assume that such distribu-










where f is a known function, µJ the location parameter, and σJ the scale parameter.
19 A distribution is recoverable from a truncated distribution if knowledge of the point of truncation and of the
distribution above the point of truncation are enough to uniquely determine it. Flinn and Heckman (1982) show that in
a search model with match-speciﬁc productivity, it is impossible to determine the shape of the productivity distribution
below the truncation point (the reservation value) without a parametric assumption. This knowledge is essential to
incorporate equilibrium effects in evaluating policy experiments.760 FLABBI












and the identiﬁcation can be described in the following ﬁve steps.
First, because ρUJ is equal to the reservation wage for each type of worker,   ρUJ is identiﬁed
by the minimum accepted wage observed in the data.
Second, the hazard rates and termination rates are identiﬁed by the unemployment rate and
by unemployment durations. This follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions on the log-likelihood,
which imply






  ηJ =
NUJ
NEJ
  hJ. (16)
Note that no information from wages is used, and therefore their identiﬁcation is secured inde-
pendently from the other six parameters.
Third, the parameters of the male productivity distribution (µM,σM) play a role only on
the accepted wage distribution for men. Because wages are truncated at the reservation wage
w∗
J = ρUJ and are a linear function of the random variable x that follows the location-scale






















lM ≡ αµM + (1 − α)ρUM
sM ≡ ασM,
(17)
which implies that the location and scale parameters lM and sM are identiﬁed from the sample
of accepted wages wi. Because α is ﬁxed and ρUM is already identiﬁed, µM and σM are then
identiﬁed by solving the two linear equations that map them into lM and sM.
Fourth, the four parameters (µW,σ W, p,d) have an impact on the accepted wage distribution














wi + αd − (1 − α)ρUW
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where
lWN ≡ αµW + (1 − α)ρUW
lWP ≡ αµW + (1 − α)ρUW − αd
sWN = sWP ≡ ασW ≡ sW.
This model constitutes a mixture of two truncated distributions that share the same scale pa-
rameter. The proportion in the mixture p, the location parameters lNW and lPW, and the scale
parameters sW are identiﬁed for a quite large class of parametric distributions gJ by having
access to a sample of accepted wages wi as shown by Teicher (1963). From lWN we can then
recover µW, since α is ﬁxed and ρUW already identiﬁed; from lWP we can secure d, since µW is
now identiﬁed. Finally, sW recovers σW since α is ﬁxed. Note that the identiﬁcation is not limited
to a mixture of two distributions, but it holds for ﬁnite mixtures, allowing for the estimation of
models with more than two types of employers.
Fifth, by Equation (10) we can recover λJ and by Equation (9) we can jointly recover ρ and
bJ.
In conclusion, the general results from the identiﬁcation strategy can be summarized as fol-
lows: (i) As in any search-matching-bargaining model, identiﬁcation depends on assuming a
parametric distribution for the match-speciﬁc productivity that should be recoverable from ob-
serving its truncation; (ii) to speciﬁcally identify prejudice and productivity differences, such
distribution should be characterized by a location and scale parameter and should allow for the
identiﬁcation of its ﬁnite mixtures.
These requirements exclude some common distributions such as the Pareto—for lack of
recoverability—and the exponential—for lack of a location parameter–but they still encompass
a quite large class of distributions. For example, the Normal, the Gamma, and the distribution
usually assumed in applied work, the Lognormal, all guarantee identiﬁcation of the model.
5. ESTIMATION
5.1. MaximumLikelihoodEstimates. FollowingFlinnandHeckman(1982),theestimation
is in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, the reservation wage is estimated by the following strongly
consistent estimator:20
  ρUJ = min
wi
{wi,i EJ}. (19)
Because of strong consistency, in the second step the parameters {λJ,ηJ,µJ,σJ, p,d} are es-
timated by directly maximizing a concentrated likelihood where   ρUJ replaces ρUJ in the log-
likelihood (13). Notice that consistency of this estimator requires the reservation wages being
equal at both employers for each worker’s type. In the heterogenous model, this is still the case
because employers are ex ante identical: Employers’ types are revealed only upon meeting,
and therefore only reservation values of the match-speciﬁc productivity will be affected. Even if
identiﬁcationisprovedintheory,itishardtopreciselyestimatepifthetwodensitiesconstituting




entirely due to d, the lack of precise estimation in the case of small separation is fully consistent
with the model: It is difﬁcult to estimate the impact of employer’s types if the types are very
similar.
Estimation results are reported in Table 2. In the ﬁrst three columns, arrival rates and ter-




    ρUJ − ρUJ
 
has a degenerate distribution: Asymptotic theory is presented in Flinn and Heckman
(1982). This estimator is also implemented by Bowlus (1997), Bowlus et al. (1995), and Kiefer and Neumann (1993).762 FLABBI
TABLE 2
MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
λ 0.2220 0.2247 0.2280
(0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0327)
λM 0.1795 0.1792 0.1795
(0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0392)
λW 0.2700 0.2777 0.2862
(0.0510) (0.0528) (0.0545)
η 0.0050 0.0050 0.0050
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
ηM 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)






µM 3.4563 3.4563 3.4563 3.4563
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0165)
σM 0.5578 0.5579 0.5578 0.5578
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
µW 3.2119 3.4575 3.2119 3.4546
(0.0187) (0.0589) (0.0187) (0.0456)
σW 0.5719 0.4222 0.5719 0.4232
(0.0140) (0.0264) (0.0140) (0.0235)
d 6.6777 13.4555 6.6786 13.5940
(3.1068) (2.6082) (3.1054) (2.3602)
p 0.8113 0.5160 0.8113 0.5065
(0.3640) (0.1483) (0.3633) (0.0988)
N 2,213 2,213 2,213 2,213 2,213 2,213
lnL −7898.945 −7901.449 −7880.325 −7896.602 −7899.115 −7877.978
LR tests
P-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0958 0.0000 0.0000
P-value 0.9994 0.9999
NOTES: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Data: CPS 1995; College graduate or more; 30–55
years old; white. Reservation values estimated by the minimum observed earning in the distribution of
eachgroup(bootstrapstandarderrors):  w∗
W =5.750(0.0911)and  w∗
M =7.175(0.0438).Theﬁrstlikelihood
ratio (LR) test is a speciﬁcation test against speciﬁcation (6); the second LR test is a speciﬁcation test
against a speciﬁcation with three types of employers.
columns they are unconstrained. Speciﬁcations (3) and (6) estimate jointly prejudice and pro-
ductivity differences. For comparison, purposes and check robustness, speciﬁcations (1) and (4)
estimate a model without prejudice and speciﬁcations (2) and (5) a model with prejudice and no
productivity differences. Table 3 reports predicted values based on the corresponding column
in Table 2.
As mentioned earlier, identiﬁcation requires a parametric assumption on the productivity-
matchdistributionthatsatisﬁessomeregularityconditions.Themostcommonassumptioninthe
literature is to consider the wage distribution or the match values distribution to be lognormally
distributed. A visual inspection of the empirical distributions of the accepted earnings (Figures
1 and 2) suggests that this is a sensible assumption on this sample.21
21 Other assumptions for the productivity distribution have been tried in estimation: the gamma distribution and the
normal distribution. The best alternative has proved to be the normal distribution even if it still generates a much worse
ﬁt than the lognormal. Point estimates are very similar to a lognormal for arrival and termination rates parameters, for
the parameters characterizing male productivity, and for the proportion of prejudiced employers. Female productivity
parameters and the disutility parameter, instead, are much more imprecisely estimated.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 763
TABLE 3
PREDICTED VALUES
Same Arrival Different Arrival
and Termination Rates and Termination Rates
No Full Estimated No Full Estimated
Prejudice Prejudice Prejudice Prejudice Prejudice Prejudice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Sample
Productivity




EM(x)3 7 .04 37.04 37.04 37.04
(0.645) (0.645) (0.645) (0.645)
VM(x) 500.76 500.79 500.77 500.77
(35.430) (35.434) (35.432) (35.432)
EW(x)2 9 .24 34.70 29.24 34.61
(0.575) (1.733) (0.575) (1.320)
VW(x) 330.75 234.95 330.74 234.92
(26.306) (20.827) (26.304) (20.799)
Earnings
EM(w| E)2 2 .17 21.39 22.17 22.17 21.39 22.17 21.94
(0.322) (0.267) (0.323) (0.323) (0.266) (0.323)
EW(w| E)1 7 .56 18.37 17.40 17.56 18.37 17.40 17.41
(0.288) (0.280) (0.295) (0.288) (0.280) (0.273)
Unemployment
uM 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038)
EM(t |U)4 .523 4.462 4.403 5.593 5.593 5.593 5.593
(0.6461) (0.6389) (0.6313) (1.2205) (1.2205) (1.2204)
uW 0.022 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052)
EW(t |U)4 .529 4.602 4.668 3.724 3.723 3.725 3.725
(0.6470) (0.6594) (0.6706) (0.7036) (0.7035) (0.7040)
NOTES: Predicted values from speciﬁcations (1)–(6) reported in Table 2. Asymptotic standard errors by Delta
method in parentheses.
Consider ﬁrst the model without prejudice: Under segmentation in the labor market, the
same model is separately estimated on the two different groups of workers. Arrival rates (λJ)
and termination rates (ηJ) are estimated to be higher for women and the estimated values for
the location and scale parameters (µJ and σJ) imply lower average productivity for women
as reported in Table 3. The gap in productivity is substantial, able to replicate the average
earningsdifferentialobservedinthedata.ThisspeciﬁcationiscomparabletoBowlus(1997)and
produces quite similar results, despite differences in the data set and in the model. Bowlus also
ﬁnds higher female arrival rates and termination rates and lower average female productivity.
Femaleproductivityisreportedtobe17%lowerinTable5ofBowlus(1997),avaluecomparable
with the 21% differential in average productivity found here under speciﬁcations (1) and (4).
As acknowledged by Bowlus, unobserved productivity difference is a “catchall” variable, ﬁtting
alltheresidualvariationinthewagedistributionsnotcapturedbythemodelincluding,possibly,
discrimination.
Consider now the model with only prejudice. Assuming no differences in productivity, most
ofthewagedifferentialmustbeexplainedbytheprejudiceparameters(p,d).Underthismodel,
the majority of the employers, about 81%, are estimated to be prejudiced against women, with
a disutility value of about 19% of the estimated average productivity. As expected, coefﬁcients
on productivity and discrimination do not change much between columns (2) and (5) because
arrival rates and termination rates are mainly identiﬁed by unemployment durations.764 FLABBI
Finally, columns (3) and (6) report estimates of the speciﬁcation in which productivity differ-
ences and explicit prejudice are jointly estimated. Results show that both components play a
signiﬁcantroleinexplainingthegenderdifferentialsweobserve.Underspeciﬁcation(3)average
female productivity, reported in Table 3, is estimated to be 6.48% lower than male productivity
andunderspeciﬁcation(6)tobeabout6.55%lower.Theextentofexplicitprejudiceissigniﬁcant
in both speciﬁcations: As reported in Table 2, the estimate of p implies that about half of the
employersareprejudicedandtheestimateofdimpliesthatdisutilityfromhiringwomenisabout
36%oftheaveragemaleproductivity.Inordertogiveanideaoftheorderofmagnitudeofthese
point estimates, consider the result about race discrimination obtained by Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002): They estimate the disutility from hiring black at about 31% of white productivity and
the proportion of prejudiced employers at about 56%.
5.2. Fit, Speciﬁcation Test, and Sensitivity Analysis. The two bottom lines of Table 2 report
p-valuesforlikelihoodratio(LR)speciﬁcationtests.Theﬁrstisatestofeachspeciﬁcationagainst
speciﬁcation(6),thesecondisatestofspeciﬁcations(3)and(6)againstamodelwiththreetypes
of employers: one unprejudiced and two prejudiced with potentially different parameters. The
ﬁrst test implies that all the restrictions are rejected, leading to the conclusion that a model
with only productivity differences or only prejudice performs worse than a model in which
both are present. This conclusion is also conﬁrmed by testing speciﬁcations (1) and (2) against
speciﬁcation (3). The second test does not reject, respectively, speciﬁcations (3) and (6), that is,
it does no reject the restriction of only two types of employers (prejudiced and unprejudiced).
A similar result is obtained by testing against a speciﬁcation with four types of employers.
As a result of this LR tests, speciﬁcation (6) will be the benchmark speciﬁcation used to
discuss the main implications of the model and to perform the policy experiments. A ﬁrst sense
of how well speciﬁcation (6) ﬁts the data is obtained by looking at ﬁto nﬁrst moments, reported
in Tables 3 and 4, and by comparing the predicted and empirical density of accepted earnings,
reported in Figures 1 and 2.
The last two columns of Table 3 show that the ﬁto nﬁrst moments is very good on unem-
ployment variables and on female earnings whereas the model slightly overestimates average
accepted male earnings. The last two rows of Table 5 compare the women/men ratio of aver-
age earnings, the measure commonly used to describe gender wage differentials. The ratios are
computed on averages over the entire distribution, column 1, and over the bottom and top 25%
quantiles, columns 2 and 3. The ﬁt is quite good on the entire distribution because the model
generates a ratio of 78.5%, quite close to the 79.4% of the sample. The model is also able to
generate the relative gain of female earnings as we move up on the distribution: The top 25%
has a higher ratio than the bottom 25%. Note that a model with only productivity differences
is not able to generate this ranking, implying almost no difference in the bottom 25% and a
signiﬁcant differential in the top 25%.
Figures 1 and 2 compare the histogram of observed earnings with the densities predicted by
the model: The ﬁt is good, in particular on female earnings. The less precise ﬁt on male earnings
ismainlyduetothethreemasspointsontherighttailofthedistributiongeneratedbytopcoding
ontheoriginaldata.Intermsofshapeofthedistribution,theestimatedmodelisabletogenerate
the crucial features of the data that were discussed in the identiﬁcation, in particular the ﬂatter
low tail of the predicted female distribution.
Before moving to the post-estimation analysis, it is also useful to check the sensitivity of the
estimates with respect to the main assumptions behind speciﬁcation (6). The main results of the
sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 4: To ease the comparison only the prejudiced param-
eters and the productivity differentials are reported. The estimates of the transition parameters
(λJ,ηJ) are almost unaffected and they are not reported.
The ﬁrstsensitivitycontroliswithrespecttotheNash-bargainingcoefﬁcientα.Asmentioned,
this parameter is extremely difﬁcult to identify without demand side information and in the
estimates has been ﬁxed at 0.5 under the assumption of symmetric Nash bargaining. Table 4
reports the estimation results when α is ﬁxed at different values, ranging from 0.3 to 0.7. ThisGENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 765
TABLE 4
SENSITIVITY OF ESTIMATION RESULTS
Sensitivity with Respect to α
α 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
p 0.547 0.529 0.507 0.482 0.446
(0.137) (0.151) (0.099) (0.170) (0.229)
d/EM(x) 0.393 0.379 0.367 0.357 0.353
(0.060) (0.068) (0.064) (0.088) (0.128)
EW(x)/EM(x) 0.957 0.946 0.934 0.922 0.909
(0.040) (0.037) (0.030) (0.032) (0.034)
Sensitivity with Respect to the Number of Employers
2 Types 3 Types










Sensitivity with Respect to the Lower Truncation Point
Truncation 1% 2% 4% 5%
p 0.551 0.533 0.536 0.507
(0.138) (0.142) (0.163) (0.099)
d/EM(x) 0.316 0.335 0.345 0.367
(0.040) (0.046) (0.059) (0.064)
EW(x)/EM(x) 0.935 0.939 0.945 0.934
(0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.030)
Sensitivity with Respect to Marital Status
Married and Single Single Single No Kids
p 0.507 0.509 0.463
(0.099) (0.106) (0.181)
d/EM(x) 0.367 0.511 0.490
(0.064) (0.073) (0.094)
EW(x)/EM(x) 0.934 1.145 1.123
(0.030) (0.063) (0.076)
NOTES: Maximum likelihood estimates obtained using the same speciﬁcation of column (6) in
Table 2. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
rangeofvaluesincludesthefewvaluesofNash-bargainingcoefﬁcientestimatedintheliterature
in reasonably similar models.22 The results show a sensitivity of the estimates to α and a clear
monotonicity: As α increases the proportion of prejudiced employers decreases, the relative
intensity of discrimination decreases, and the productivity differentials increases. However, the
differences are relatively small and generally not statistically signiﬁcant even if the range of α
considered is relatively large.
The second sensitivity control is with respect to the number of types of employers: in the
baseline speciﬁcation only one prejudiced type and one unprejudiced type are assumed. As
shown in Table 2, a likelihood ration test does not reject this restriction against a model in which
two types of prejudiced employers with potentially two different discrimination intensity are
22 Flinn (2006) estimates a value between 0.355 and 0.429 and Cahuc et al. (2006) between 0.300 and 0.635.766 FLABBI
TABLE 5
EARNINGS DIFFERENTIAL DECOMPOSITION
Women/Men Ratio Entire Bottom Top Reservation
Generated by Distribution 25% 25% Values
Productivity (µ,σ) 0.917 1.058 0.884 0.842
Prejudice (d, p) :
- with spillover effects 0.819 0.642 0.905 0.573
- without spillover effects 0.855 0.671 0.930
Transitions (λ,η) 1.168 1.351 1.084 1.832
All parameters
- with spillover effects 0.785 0.766 0.814 0.801
- without spillover effects 0.801 0.775 0.828
Sample 0.794 0.784 0.800 0.801
NOTES: Women/men ratio on average accepted earnings computed over the entire distribu-
tion or over the bottom and top 25% quantiles. The last column reports the ratio of the two
reservation wages. Results based on speciﬁcation (6), Table 2.
allowed. Table 4 explains why: The third type of employer is estimated to be very similar to
the existing prejudiced employers. In other words, the point estimates of d for the two types
of prejudiced employers are not signiﬁcantly different. Moreover, the overall proportion of
prejudiced employers is estimated to be identical to the proportion of prejudiced employers
under the two-types speciﬁcation.
The third sensitivity control concerns the 5% cutoff point chosen to eliminate unrealistically
low hourly earnings from the estimation sample. Reservation values are directly affected by the
cutoff point: They range from 3.63 for women and 4.25 for men with a 1% cutoff point to 5.75
for women and 7.175 for men with the 5% cutoff point. However, the other relevant parameter
estimates are quite stable with respect to changes in the cutoff point. As shown in Table 4, with
a 1% cutoff point the proportion of prejudiced employers is estimated to be 55.11%, with a
disutility parameter equal to about one-third of the average male productivity compared with
the 50.65% and a very similar relative disutility estimated with the cutoff point at 5%. In terms
of estimated productivity, the ratio of average female productivity over male productivity is
estimated to be 93.47% with a 1% cutoff point compared with the 93.40% estimated with the
cutoff at 5%. The 2% and 4% cutoff points also report very similar results.23
Finally, a fourth sensitivity control refers to a model limitation. The model does not explicitly
considerothersourcesofgroupheterogeneitybetweenmenandwomenontopofdiscrimination.
Empirically, speciﬁcation (6) allows for all the parameters to be gender speciﬁc, and this may
capture group heterogeneity in a reduced form way. A crucial source of asymmetry between
menandwomenisfamilyworkandthedifferentrolesthatmenandwomenhaveincontributing
to household income. Without explicitly incorporating this decision in the model, it may still be
interesting to see how results change if we focus only on individuals without a family: single and
single without children. The bottom panel of Table 4 reports the results of this exercise. The
relative discrimination intensity and the relative productivity differential change signiﬁcantly.
The reason for these two changes is that both men and women have a higher productivity in
this sample than in the overall sample, but the difference is larger for women than for men. The
result is consistent with the literature tentatively indicating that single women are positively
selected in terms of labor market performance.24 With respect to the proportion of prejudiced
employers, the point estimates are instead remarkably stable: p is still around 50%.
23 The 3% cutoff point is not reported because the cutoff coincides with a mass point of observations at 5 dollars per
hour, probably due to some rounding in the raw data. This mass point exactly at the truncation point is not predicted
by the model and the estimation procedure has some difﬁculties to ﬁt it.
24 These results depends on demographic characteristics, human capital, and life cycle issues. Moreover, the mapping
between labor market productivity and out of labor market productivity is notoriously difﬁcult to identify, in particular
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The conclusion from the sensitivity analysis is that the main parameters are relatively stable
with respect to these controls and that the use of speciﬁcation (6) in Table 2 as the favorite
speciﬁcation to perform policy experiments should not be too misleading.
5.3. EarningsDifferentialDecomposition. Theempiricalliteratureondiscriminationoften
employs wage regressions to decompose the observed wage differentials into different compo-
nents, including discrimination or proxies for it. In a typical wage regression decomposition,
estimated returns on productivity characteristics are separated from average endowments of
these characteristics. The part of the wage differential due to difference in returns is often in-
terpreted as discrimination.25 Based on the estimates in Table 2 and the model used to generate
them,itispossibletoperformasimilarwagedifferentialdecompositionwiththeadvantagethat
the equilibrium effects of the conterfactual experiments can be taken into account.
Table 5 presents the results of this decomposition. The table shows ratios of female average
earnings over male average earnings. Each cell of each column reports the contribution of the
corresponding component. For example, the ﬁrst cell in the ﬁrst column, labeled productivity,
reportsthewagedifferentialthatwouldarisefromanenvironmentinwhichmenandwomenare
identical except for productivity and there is no prejudice. Conditioning on this environment, a
newequilibriumisgeneratedandearningdistributionsforeachtypeofworkerareobtained.The
implied earning differential, as expressed by the ratio of the average female accepted earnings




are reported for ratios computed on the entire sample (ﬁrst column) and on the bottom and
top 25% quantiles (second and third columns) The parameter estimates used to perform the
experiment are speciﬁcation (6) in Table 2. When parameters are set equal for both groups, they
are set at male values.
Focusing ﬁrst on the entire distribution, results show that all groups of variables, except
Transitions, contribute to the negative female earning differential. The parameters labeled as
Transitions are the arrival rate of offer and the termination rate of the job contract. They favor
womenbecausethepositiveimpactofthehigherarrivalratemorethancompensatethenegative
impact of the higher termination rate. Prejudice generates the highest differential, even if below
the value observed in the data. As expected, the lower estimated female productivity has also
a signiﬁcant negative impact. In order to summarize the results on the full sample, if all the
difference between men and women was due to differences in productivity, the differential
should be about 8%; if all the difference was due to prejudice, the differential should be about
18%; ﬁnally, when all the ingredients are blended together a differential of about 21% should
be generated, closely matching the one observed in the data.
Looking at results on ratios of quantiles, we see that differences in productivity imply no
negative differential for women at low levels of the distributions but a substantial differential
as we move up in the accepted earnings distribution. On the contrary, prejudice implies that the
differential decreases as wages increases. This implication matches the data26 (last row) and it
is not consistent with the so called glass ceiling hypothesis.27 Women are in a relatively better
position at the top of the distribution than at the bottom because the proportion of women
working for prejudiced employers is lower at the top than at the bottom and women working
for prejudiced employers are the ones suffering the largest wage discrimination. This is a direct
result of the equilibrium wage schedule (5): The accepted wage distribution of women working
25 For surveys and references, see Blau and Kahn (2000) and Altonji and Blank (1999).
26 CPSdatasufferfromtop-codingandtop-codingaffectsmalewagesinhigherproportion.Theamountoftop-coding
on the estimation sample, though, seems too small to fundamentally bias moments computed on the top 25% quantile.
27 The glass ceiling hypothesis states that the most important asymmetry between men and women in the labor
market is the low proportion of women that reach high level—high paying jobs. Albrecht et al. (2003) also ﬁnd that a
glass ceiling does not seem the main determinant of the gender wage gap in the United States.768 FLABBI
forprejudicedemployersisshifteddownbytheparameterdsothatevenarelativelyhighmatch
speciﬁc productivity draw generates a relatively low wage.
These results on ratios of quantiles are also another way to look at the identiﬁcation. They
show that the crucially different implication of productivity with respect to prejudice is not on
the conditional mean but on the shape of the distribution: Productivity differences predict an
higher differential as we move up in the distribution whereas prejudice predicts the opposite.
As mentioned, the model allows for spillover effects to take place and the earning differential
decompositions may give an idea of the extent of their impact on the relevant labor market
outcomes. When prejudice is present, is then possible to compare what the earnings differential
would have been if spillover effects were not at work. The values reported in Table 5 in the
row labelled without spillover effects are obtained by computing the average wage of women
at unprejudiced employers shutting down the equilibrium impact of the presence of prejudiced
employers, that is eliminating the impact on their outside option when bargaining with unprej-
udiced employers. When spillover effects are not at work the earning differentials is reduced by
a relatively signiﬁcant amount. For example, on the overall sample the differential decrease by
about7.5%.Thehigherrelativedecreaseisontheexperimentwhereonlyprejudicecharacterize
the differences between gender because it is the environment where the equilibrium impact of
spillover is potentially larger. In this case, the differential decrease by about 20% on the entire
distribution and by about 26% on the top percentile.
Finally, looking at the ratio of reservation wages, reported in the last column, prejudice is
the component that has the strongest impact on the negative female differential, lowering the
female/male ratio from about 0.8 to about 0.57. Differences in the exogenous arrival and ter-
mination rates, instead, would predict an higher outside option for women, and productivity
differentials would predict a ratio only slightly higher than the one observed in the data.
6. POLICY EXPERIMENTS
The gender discrimination literature has devoted a lot of attention to average wage differ-
entials. The overall welfare of labor market participants, although, is dependent not only on
average wages but on the entire wage distribution and on the dynamic of the labor market,
such as the transition probabilities between states and the durations in each state. It is therefore
useful to deﬁne indicators that may give a more complete description of the overall workers’
welfare, taking into account at least some of the labor market dynamic.
An appropriate indicator seems a utilitarian welfare function that associates welfare value
to each state occupied by individuals in equilibrium. A more detailed motivation and a com-
plete derivation of these measures is presented in Appendix A5, but a brief deﬁnition is the
following.Forworkers,theproposedwelfaremeasureistheaverageofthevalueofeachstate—
unemployment and employment at each acceptable match-speciﬁc productivity value—taken
over the equilibrium distribution of types. For employers, the proposed welfare measure is the
average of the per-worker utility value times the proportion of that type of workers hired in
steady state.
The ﬁrst column of Table 6 reports the agents’ welfare measures when prejudice and produc-
tivity differences are jointly estimated. This speciﬁcation is called the Benchmark Model and
corresponds to the estimates reported in column (6) of Table 2. The workers’ welfare values are
normalized with respect to the male value, and the employers’ welfare values are normalized
with respect to the unprejudiced employers value. The lower panel in Table 6 shows some labor
market variables related to workers’ welfare.
On the workers’ side, as expected, average welfare is about 24% lower for women than for
men. This relative disadvantage is higher than the gap indicated by the indicators considered so
far. For example, looking at the bottom panel of Table 6, average accepted earnings are about
21.5% lower for women than for men, and the reservation wage is about 19.9% lower. The ratio
ofreservationwagesisinterestingbecauseitisalsoequaltotheratioofvaluesofunemployment,
which are also the ex ante value of participating in the labor market. On the employers’ side,GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 769
TABLE 6





Men 100 100 98.53
Women 75.85 89.11 77.65
Overall 88.99 95.04 89.01
Employers
Unprejudiced 100 103.36 99.87
Prejudiced 79.01 82.77 78.88
Overall 89.37 92.93 89.22
Workers’ labor market variables
w∗
M 7.175 7.175 7.418
w∗
W 5.750 7.365 6.507
EM(w| E)2 2 .17 22.17 21.84
EW(w| E)1 7 .40 20.40 17.79
EM(t |U)5 .593 5.593 5.597
EW(t |U)3 .725 3.964 3.714
uM 0.017 0.017 0.018
uW 0.028 0.030 0.028
NOTES:T h eBenchmark Model is speciﬁcation (6), Table 2. Same productivity means women
at men productivity. Afﬁrmative action means employer receives a ﬂow subsidy of 1 dollar
per hour when hiring a woman and the subsidy is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on workers; the
earningsreportedinthelowerpartofthetablearenetofthistax.Thetoppanelreportsaverage
welfare normalized with respect to male workers in the benchmark model and with respect to
unprejudiced employers in the benchmark model.
unprejudiced employers are better off than prejudiced employers: Prejudiced employers pay in
part their distaste for women but search frictions still guarantee them positive proﬁt and utility.
Because both productivity differences and prejudice contribute to the worse performance of
women in the labor market, it is interesting to isolate the impact of these two components on
welfare. A rationale for this exercise can be to separate the impact of some prelabor market
factors—factors that are more likely to affect the unobserved productivity represented by the
G(x)distribution—fromsomespeciﬁclabormarketfactors—suchasthepresenceofprejudiced
employers. The experiment is similar to the one reported in Table 5 but now focusing on the
overall welfare impact. The second column of Table 6 reports the results: Women and both
types of employers are better off whereas men’s welfare is unchanged. As expected, the result
is a Pareto improvement because we are exogenously increasing the productivity of women.
However, the difference in welfare between men and women is still sizable, with female welfare
about 10% lower than male welfare.
AﬁrstpolicythatwouldbeinterestingtoconsiderisanEqualPayPolicy.AnEqualPayPolicy
should require each employer to pay the same wage to workers with identical productivity.
However, in the context of the model presented in the article, such a policy rises clear problems
ofenforcement.Themainissueisthatanexternalagent,suchasthepublicauthorityresponsible
of enforcing the policy, cannot directly observe the match-speciﬁc value of productivity, and the
measuresusedtoproxythisproductivityareoftenquitelimited.Apossibleimplementationcan
be obtained by interpreting the Nash bargaining outcome as a reduced form sharing rule where
offered wages are simply an average of the wages that would be offered without the policy.
However, this would constitute a major change in wage determination on top of a change in
policy. An attempts to implement this policy is presented in Flabbi (2005), which shows how it
generates a major improvement in women’s welfare at a cost of a large reduction in employers’
welfare.770 FLABBI
Given the previous limitations, I will focus instead on an equally relevant set of policies:
Afﬁrmative Action Policies. An Afﬁrmative Action policy is an anti-discrimination policy that
requires proactive steps (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). In the economic literature, this broad
deﬁnitionisveryoftenlimitedtothatofaquotasystem.28Aquotasystemisaspeciﬁcpolicywhere
a system of numerical yardsticks for minority in hiring, federal contracts, or school enrollment
are exogenously imposed.
The difference between a quota system and a more general deﬁnition of afﬁrmative action is
consideredcruciallyimportantbybothHolzerandNeumark(2000)intheirreviewassessingthe
impact of afﬁrmative action in the labor market and by Donohue and Heckman (1991) in their
study of the impact of Civil Rights policies in improving the relative performance of blacks in
the labor market. The difference between the two deﬁnitions is also considered very relevant by
thelastSupremeCourtopinionaboutafﬁrmativeaction.29 TheCourthasconsideredadmissible
an afﬁrmative action policy of the University of Michigan Law School, but it is very careful in
interpreting afﬁrmative action not as a quota system but as “a narrowly tailored plan system”
in which “ race or ethnicity” may be considered “a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s ﬁle.”30
Whether a quota system has a signiﬁcant impact in the model under consideration or not is
mainlyanempiricalquestion.Bylookingatmatchingratesweexpectthatprejudicedemployers
will hire proportionally less women than unprejudiced employers, but by Corollary 2 we know
that a positive proportion of women will always be hired by both types of employers. Therefore,
we have to look at the actual proportions implied by the estimated values to see if imposing
a quota will be effective. The estimated parameters imply that the steady-state proportions
of women working at a prejudiced and unprejudiced employer are, respectively, 43.7% and
46.9%, out of a population where women count for 45.6% of the labor force. In this context,
any quota policy that imposes a minimum proportion of women to be hired lower than 43.7%
will have no impact. This level is quite high if compared to the usual level enforced by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and it shows an environment in which the
numerical yardstick is met but prejudice and its impact are unaffected.
Since at the estimated values a quota policy has a very limited impact, it may be interesting to
focusonanafﬁrmativeactionpolicythatdoesnotexplicitlyusequotasandthatmaycapturethe
main indications of the Supreme Court rulings. An afﬁrmative action policy deﬁned as a subsidy
received by employers for hiring women may constitute a crude model for such a policy. More
precisely, assume that employers receive a ﬂow subsidy γ for each woman employed, for all the
time the employment relation lasts. The subsidy is paid by a lump-sum tax t on all the workers.
This policy is a proactive policy quite easy to implement and enforce. In spirit, it is similar
to policy interventions that create incentives to hire ﬁrst-seekers by lowering minimum wage
requirement or other job related costs. It is also observational equivalent to other afﬁrmative
actionpoliciesimplementedinpractice,suchasthe“plus-factor”ideasupportedbytheSupreme
Court ruling. Moreover, a subsidy policy is particularly interesting in the context of this model
because the impact of the subsidy is magniﬁed by the spillover effects, now working in favor of
women.
Thepolicyaffectsproﬁtsandwagesschedules.Deﬁningwithγ theexogenouslyﬁxedemploy-
ers’ subsidy, the employers’ utility will be
πJI = x − dI{W,P} − w + γI{W}, J = W, M; I = N, P. (20)
28 Welch (1976) is one of the ﬁrst to introduce and calibrate a model to study afﬁrmative action and he deﬁnes the
policy as a quota system. Other and more recent contributions using a quota system deﬁnition are Coate and Loury
(1993) and Moro and Norman (2003).
29 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Both rulings are related to
afﬁrmative action policies at the University of Michigan but they are though to have a strong impact also on the labor
market through the afﬁrmative action policies that most of U.S. corporations implement.
30 Excerpts from Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion on Grutter V. Bollinger (Law School Case), June 24, 2003. In
the same opinion, the Court explicitly states that “ a race-conscious admission program cannot use a quota system.”GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 771
The workers’ utility will be equal to the wage net of the tax
wJI(x,UJ) − t (γ), J = W, M; I = N, P,
where t (γ) is the endogenously determined lump-sum tax. The tax level t depends on all the
parameters of the model, but to simplify notation I simply emphasize the dependence on γ.T h e
wagedeterminationdoesnotchange.WagesaredeterminedbyNashbargaininguponobserving
types and productivity, leading to the following wage schedules:
wMI(x,UM,t) = αx + (1 − α)[t (γ) + ρUM], I = N, P,
wWI(x,UW,t) = α [x + γ − dI(P)] + (1 − α)[t (γ) + ρUW].
(21)
The reservation values that determine the decision rules31 are
x∗
MI = ρUM + t (γ), I = N, P
x∗
WI = ρUW + t (γ) − γ + dI(P),
(22)
from which we can obtain the equilibrium values of unemployment (UW (γ),UM(γ)).T h e
(instantaneous) value of the tax t is determined by equating the total subsidy to the total tax.
The subsidy is paid by both men and women but only beneﬁts women. Then, we expect the
value to participate in the labor market to increase for women and decrease for men once the
policy is implemented. This result is stated in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. For any positive subsidy γ previously deﬁned, the women’s outside option






Even if by Proposition 2 we know the impact of the policy on the values of unemployment,





on the wage schedules: men’s wages will be lower at any productivity values and women’s wages
will be higher. With respect to a pre-policy environment, women’s earnings, conditioning on
same x and same employer type I = N, P, increase by
wWI(x,γ) − t − wWI(x) = α (γ − t) + (1 − α)[ρUW (γ) − ρUW] > 0,
where the amount is positive since γ>t and ρUW (γ) >ρ UW. The second term on the RHS
is the spillover effect, now favoring women and magnifying the effect of the policy: Women get
higherwagesnotsimplybecausetheyaretheonlybeneﬁciaryofasubsidythatmenalsopay(i.e.
(γ − t)) but also because their bargaining position has improved (i.e. [ρUW (γ) − ρUW]). For
men, the opposite is true: Their lower outside option induced by the lump-sum tax reinforces
the decrease in earnings.
The policy implemented on the estimated model sets the subsidy at one dollar. This is a
reasonably large subsidy because it corresponds to one dollar an hour more for each woman






becomes negative. If this is the case,
there is no truncation and all the matches are acceptable because the support of x is R+. I ignore this case in the text
because I will only consider small enough subsidies.772 FLABBI
employed for all the time the employment relation lasts. It also corresponds to about 10% of
the disutility parameter. Results are reported in the last column of Table6.T h en e tincrease in
women’s earning is 42 cents an hour at any level of x. In terms of equilibrium effects, 64% of
the impact is due to sharing the tax with men and 36% is due to the spillover effect. Once again,
spillover effects play a signiﬁcant role.
Women’s welfare increases by about 1.8 percentage points and men’s welfare decreases by
about 1.5 percentage points. A welfare gap remains even after this relatively generous subsidy:
The reason is not simply a difference in productivity but also the presence of prejudice that still
has an impact. In particular, wage discrimination is still present at prejudiced employers but it
is not at unprejudiced employers. Conditioning on same productivity, women’s earnings are 6.7
dollars lower than men’s earning at prejudiced employers and 4 cents higher than men’s earning
at unprejudiced employers.
Employers’ welfare is almost unaffected because both a positive and a negative impact are
present. The positive impact is the presence of the subsidy and the lower outside option of men;
the negative impact is the presence of the tax that increases reservation values and the higher
outside option for women that reduces wage discrimination. The policy has also an impact on
the quota of women hired at the two types of employers: Prejudiced employers hire a higher
proportionofwomenthaninthepre-policysetting.Asexpected,thereisatendencytoconverge
to the proportion of men and women in the labor force, but changes are very small.32
To summarize, this afﬁrmative action policy implies a redistribution of welfare from men to
women,leavingemployers’welfarealmostunaffected.Theimpactisrelativelymodestforasub-
sidy of one dollar an hour, but it implies that wage discrimination is eliminated at unprejudiced
employers.
7. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The methodology proposed in the article describes some crucial features of the workers’s
labor market dynamic and leads to precise and robust estimates. However, it also has some
limitations.
A ﬁrst limitation concerns the employers, side of the model: It is highly stylized, taking the
proportion of prejudiced employers as exogenous and potentially reducing the equilibrium
effectsthatmaybetakenintoaccountwhenpolicyexperimentsareimplemented.Aninteresting
extension will then be to obtain endogenously the proportion of prejudiced employers. An
exampleisBlack(1995),wherea“primitive”distributionoftastefordiscriminationistruncated
at a reservation value that depends on market conditions. An alternative, and very preliminary,
contributionisFlabbi(2004),whichattemptstoaddressanotherlimitationofthemodel:thelack
ofdirectedsearch.InFlabbi(2004),prejudicedandunprejudicedemployersareseenasdifferent
sectors toward which workers may direct their search and meeting rates are endogenous. In this
context, congestion effects may generate equilibria in which all types of employers survive. The
use of directed search is particularly promising, because workers subject to discrimination may
want to direct their search toward nondiscriminatory employers or employers may direct their
search toward certain group of workers. Mailath et al. (2000) show how both equilibria with and
withoutdiscriminationmayariseevenwithexanteidenticalworkersoncethesemechanismsare
in place. The main problem in the empirical implementation of these models is the asymmetry
betweentheobservablecharacteristicsthatassignworkerstoagivengroupandtheonlypartially
observable characteristics that identify prejudiced employers.
Asecondlimitationisthatlabormarketparticipationisexogenous,ignoringadecisioncharac-
terizedbygenderasymmetries.Evenifthedifferentialinparticipationbetweenmenandwomen
on the white college-graduate sample considered in this article33 is relatively small, the general
issue of the different behavior of men and women with respect to labor market participation is
32 Thechangesintheproportionofwomenhiredbybothemployers’typesareintheorderof0.002percentagepoints.
33 CPS data on this demographic group report a participation rate of 96% for men and 82% for women.GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 773
a relevant one. A possible way to accommodate this difference is to use data on nonparticipants
to estimate a “value for nonparticipation” distribution and embed the participation decision in
the search model environment. A complete treatment of labor market intermittence is much
more complex and would entail extending the model to an on-the-job search environment and
modeling fertility decisions and household behavior.34
A third limitation is not allowing for statistical discrimination. Statistical discrimination is
an alternative theory of discrimination with respect to the taste discrimination theory adopted
in the article. Focusing on only one of the two theories of discrimination is essential to obtain
identiﬁcation (Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002). The choice of taste discrimination has a couple
of advantages: (i) the ability to differentiate between discrimination and prejudice and (ii) the
predictionofwageschedulessimilartotheonesgeneratedbyastandardstatisticaldiscrimination
model. Still, statistical discrimination remains an interesting and compelling explanation for
discrimination and it has been successfully included in structurally estimated models of race
discrimination (e.g., Moro, 2003). Recent interesting applications to gender discrimination are
Gayle and Golan (2008) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2009). As it seems very unlikely to obtain
identiﬁcation of two types of discrimination and of productivity differences, one way to proceed
could be to nest both types of discrimination in the same general model and then compare the
empirical performance of models that incorporate only one type of discrimination.
A fourth major limitation is the necessity of functional form assumptions for identiﬁcation.
This limitation is common to all partial equilibrium search models, and part of the point of
this article is to show that under the same assumptions it is possible to also separately identify
discrimination. Still, the concern that the estimation results are sensitive to functional form
assumptions is a real one, and it is only partially addressed by the sensitivity analysis presented
in the article. An improvement in this direction could be working with a search model that
does not require a productivity distribution assumption to obtain identiﬁcation, such as the
equilibrium search models based on Burdett and Mortensen (1998). The well-known problem
of these models is their poor ﬁt on the observed wage distribution: This limitation will make
the identiﬁcation of discrimination even harder, given its reliance on shape differences in the
observed wage distribution between men and women. Progress can be made by the use of
matchedemployer–employeedata(Postel-VinayandRobin,2002).Thisdirectionisparticularly
promising for the identiﬁcation of discrimination, since the wage distribution and the gender
mix at each employer convey information about the employer’s intensity of discrimination.
However, this will require very detailed matched employer–employee data in which the entire
distribution of workers at each employer can be observed.35
Finallyasixthlimitation,quitecommonamongsearchmodels,isthetreatmentofjobsasfully
described by their wage, with no other characteristics taken into consideration. This limitation
is particularly crucial when comparing men and women, because there is evidence that they
may have signiﬁcantly different preferences over job characteristics. The current model can
partially capture this by estimating all the parameters as gender speciﬁc. For example, the lower
estimated “productivity” for women may be explained in part by a different willingness to
pay for job amenities. Moreover, the sensitivity section presents estimates only for a group of
individuals on which the problem is less severe (single) showing robustness in the estimates
of some crucial parameters. However, this is very different from explicitly taking into account
which job amenities are important and are part of the bargaining process. A strong candidate is
workﬂexibility(AltonjiandPaxson,1988).Apreliminaryattempttoextendanestimablesearch
model in this direction is Flabbi and Moro (2010) where a simple binary regime of ﬂexibility
34 Without introducing fertility, a few authors have started to estimate search models with some treatment of house-
hold behavior (see, e.g., Dey and Flinn, 2008).
35 Usual matched employer–employee data only allow for the observation of a limited sample of workers or some
summary statistics of the ﬁrm workforce. The availability of administrative data has made the construction of data sets
with a complete recording of all workers at each ﬁrm feasible if not easy. Major hurdles are privacy issues and the lack
of some major covariates (as it is, for example, in the case for Italy and France, where education variables are missing).
For a review, see Abowd and Kramarz (1999).774 FLABBI
is part of the labor contract within a search and bargaining framework. They are not able to
estimate a comparable model for men and women, but they show that most college-educated
women value ﬂexibility and that reducing the cost of its provision may considerably reduce the
gender wage gap.
8. CONCLUSION
By developing a search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining, and employers’
taste discrimination, this article shows that it is possible to separately identify and estimate
gender discrimination and unobserved productivity differences under standard functional form
assumptions. The key results are obtained by exploiting the markedly different shape of the
accepted earnings distribution of women and men. Prejudice is characterized as the disutility
that a proportion of employers receives when hiring women. The bargaining setting generates
spillover effects: The presence of some prejudiced employers lowers women’s outside option
with respect to men, generating wage discrimination also at unprejudiced employers. These
effects have been neglected by the previous literature, and they are estimated to have a sizable
impact.
Maximum likelihood estimates derived from Current Population Survey data show that both
discrimination and productivity differences are present in the labor market for white college
graduates. Average female productivity is estimated to be about 6.5% lower than male produc-
tivity, and about half of the employers are estimated to be prejudiced. The earning differential
decomposition shows that prejudice is the most important factor in generating the difference
betweenaverageacceptedmaleandfemaleearnings.Ifthedifferencebetweenmenandwomen
were due exclusively to prejudice, we should observe about two-thirds of this gap; if the differ-
enceweredueexclusivelytoproductivityaboutone-thirdofthisgapwouldremain.Bothresults
are based on conterfactual experiments that take into account equilibrium effects.
A set of afﬁrmative action policies is considered. An afﬁrmative action policy implemented
as a strict quota policy is shown to be not binding. More in line with the recent Supreme Court
ruling,36 an alternative proactive policy is implemented. The policy, deﬁned as an employer’s
subsidy for hiring women, results in a redistribution of welfare from men to women, leaving
employers’ welfare almost unaffected.
APPENDIX
A.1. Derivation of Value Functions (1), (2), and (6). The value of employment at a wage
wJI for a worker J is given by the following discrete time approximation where  t denotes a
time span:
WJ(wJI) = wJI t + ρ( t)[(1 − η t)WJ(wJI) + η tUJ + o( t)]. (A.1)
Expression(A.1)statesthatthevalueofemploymentisgivenbythewagesreceivedintheentire
period plus the discounted expected value of remaining at the job or of falling in the unemploy-
ment state. Other possible events are happening with a negligible probability o( t). Assuming
ρ( t) = (1 − ρ t)
−1 andbecausethePoissonprocessassumptionimpliesthatlim t→0
o( t)
 t = 0,






equal to b t and by the the fact that after a period  t three main events may happen: not
36 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 775
meeting any ﬁrm, meeting a prejudiced employer, or meeting an unprejudiced employer. This
process generates the following:
UJ = b t + ρ( t)
 
(1 − λ t)UJ + λp t
 
max[WJ(wJP),UJ]dG(θ)
+λ(1 − p) t
 




Converging to continuous time this expression becomes











Equation (A.4) generates the equilibrium Equation (6) once the reservation value optimal
decision rule and the wage schedule are inserted in it. The result is immediate once considering
that









(x − dI{W,P} − ρUJ).
A.2. Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries.
Proposition 1
PROOF. Rewrite the reservation Equations (6) as













where ρUW ≡ x∗(d, p) for 0 < p < 1 and d > 0 and ρUM ≡ x∗(0,0). I have also exploited in-
tegration by parts to rewrite
 
x∗[x − x∗]dG(x) =
 
x∗ ˜ G(x)dx. Given the deﬁnition of ρUW and








< 0i f d > 0. (A.7)











[p ˜ G(x∗(d, p) + d) + (1 − p) ˜ G(x∗(d, p))]776 FLABBI
and observe that all the parameters are positive, the survival function assumes only positive
values and the numerator is negative due to the minus sign.














[p ˜ G(x∗(d, p) + d) + (1 − p) ˜ G(x∗(d, p))]
and observe that all the parameters are positive, the survival function assumes only positive
values and again the numerator is negative due to the minus sign. 
COROLLARY 1. For any equilibrium previously deﬁned such that 0 < p < 1 and d > 0, women
suffers wage discrimination and spillover effects with respect to men.
PROOF. By wage schedules (4) and (5) we know
wWP(x) − wMP(x) =− αd + (1 − α)ρ (UW − UM) < 0,
wWN(x) − wMN(x) = (1 − α)ρ (UW − UM) < 0,
where both differentials are negative independently from x because d > 0 and, by proposition
(2), UW < UM. 
COROLLARY 2. For any equilibrium previously deﬁned such that 0 < p < 1 and d > 0, there is
no complete segregation.
PROOF. Men are indifferent between working for the two types of employers, and therefore
they will work for both as long as both are present. Women ex ante prefer to work for unpreju-
dicedemployers,butoncetheymeetanemployerofanytypetheywillaccepttoenterthematch
if the wage is high enough. In equilibrium, the proportion of women working for unprejudiced
employers is given by the ratio of the hazard rates:
PWN =
(1 − p) ˜ G(ρUW)
(1 − p) ˜ G(ρUW) + p ˜ G(ρUW + d)
,
where ˜ G(x) denotes the survival function [1 − G(x)]. Complete segregation arises only if
PWN = 1 ⇐⇒ p = 0 since UW < +∞,
PWN = 0 ⇐⇒ p = 1 since UW > 0;
therefore, no complete segregation arises when 0 < p < 1. Partial segregation of women in the








˜ G(ρUW + d)
˜ G(ρUW)
,
that is, if the proportion of prejudiced employers is not so high to offset the lower acceptance
probability induced by the higher reservation value. Partial segregation in the prejudiced sector
arises if the opposite is true. GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 777
Proposition 2









−p ˜ G(ρUW + t − γ + d)
∂(ρUW + t − γ + d)
∂γ
−(1 − p) ˜ G(ρUW + t − γ)





















{p ˜ G(ρUW + t − γ + d) + (1 − p) ˜ G(ρUW + t − γ)}







This term is negative because the tax is on both men and women so that the increase in t is
always smaller than the increase in γ. This negative term cancels out with the minus sign of









− ˜ G(ρUM + t)






















where the claim is proven because all the terms are positive and there is a minus sign in front of
the RHS. 
A.3. Data Appendix. The estimation sample is extracted from the Annual Social and Eco-
nomic Supplement (March Supplement) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year
1995. The raw data ﬁles were provided by Unicon. The CPS is organized around monthly in-
terviews with different content. The March survey focuses on work experience, income sources
and amounts, non-cash beneﬁts, health insurance, and migration and allows for the construction
of unemployment durations. Information about weekly and hourly pay is collected each month
on a random subset of respondents. They constitute the Earner Study and they are individuals
in the last month of their four-month participation period (i.e., they are in rotation groups 4 and
8).
On this, some homogeneity controls are used. The sample is limited to individuals that at
the moment of the interview are 30–55 years old, employed or looking for a job, white, and a
college graduate or more. The age limitation is introduced to focus on individuals with mature
working careers: They are reasonably homogenous in terms of working experience and are778 FLABBI
TABLE A.1
ESTIMATION SAMPLE EXTRACTION
CPS raw data sample 149,642
Only relevant observations
In the 4th and 8th in-month-sample −111,784
In the labor force −19,238
Eligible for Earner Study −3243
Homogeneity criteria
Employed or looking for a job −192
Mature working career (30–55 years old) −5932
White −1372
College or more −5481
Data cleaning
Top-coded durations −3
Impossible to obtain hourly earnings −67




NOTE: Data from CPS—March 1995.
more likely to be in the steady state position assumed by the model. Only individuals employed
or looking for a job are considered to exclude the category layoffs because layoffs are a labor
market dynamic typically not related with the search process. Because race or ethnic group
is an observable highly correlated with labor market performance, I concentrate only on the
most numerous ethnic group, that is, whites.37 Education is a necessary homogeneity control
because it is one of the main component of the individual human capital, and schooling is highly
correlated with labor market performance. The group of college graduated or more seems the
most appropriate to ﬁt the behavior assumed in the model because a one to one bargaining is
more likely to occur for skilled labor. Moreover, employers are more likely to have a direct
and frequent contact with workers in skilled job positions; therefore skilled jobs are a setting in
which the taste discrimination argument seems more plausible.
The ﬁrst relevant variable to deﬁne the likelihood is unemployment durations. An individual
unemploymentdurationisoriginallyrecordedinweeksandin1995istop-codedat99weeks.The
estimationsampleincludesalltheindividualssatisfyingthepreviousfourcriteriaexceptthethree
observations with unemployment durations top-coded at 99 weeks. As standard in the search
literature, the weekly unemployment durations are transformed in to monthly unemployment
durations.
The second relevant variable are earnings, only observed for individuals currently employed.
Earningsarerecordedbeforedeductionsonanhourlyorweeklybasis.Forsomeindividualsboth
observations are available but usually only one of the two is present. I transformed all earnings
in hourly earnings either using the recorded observation directly or by dividing weekly earnings
for the number of hours worked per week reported by the individual. For 67 observations it is
impossible to calculate hourly earnings because the number of hours worked is missing.
This background information helps in understanding the extraction process presented in
Table A.1. Thanks to the high number of observations in the raw sample, the estimation sample
after the homogeneity controls still contains more than 1,000 observations for both men and
women.
37 The classiﬁcation white in the CPS is chosen by respondents out of the following alternatives: White, Black,
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A.4. Derivation of Likelihood Contributions. The subscript J denotes the worker’s type:
J = W, M, and the subscript I denotes the employer’s type: I = N, P. The time homogeneity
of the environment, the Poisson process that governs the arrival of job offers, and the optimal
decision rule imply a constant hazard rate out of unemployment. The hazard rate is given by
the probability to meet an employer times the probability to accept the match
hJ = λJ[(1 − p) ˜ G(ρUJ) + p ˜ G(ρUJ + dI{W,P})]. (A.8)
Thishazardfunctionuniquelydetermine,thedistributionofcompleteunemploymentdurations:
It is exponential with parameter equal to the hazard rate. The corresponding density function is
fc(ti | J) = hJ exp(−hJti), ti > 0. (A.9)
Unemployment durations in the sample have two limitations: They are the time in unemploy-
ment up to the sampling date (on-going unemployment durations) and they are observed only
forindividualscurrentlyunemployed.Becausethedistributionofcompletespellsisexponential,
ongoing spells are also exponential:38
fu(ti |i U, J) = hJ exp(−hJti), ti > 0. (A.10)
The intuition is that the underestimation due to right censoring is compensated by the overes-
timation due to length bias. The second limitation is taken into account using ergodic results to
weight the density by the probability of being unemployed,39 leading to the following uncondi-
tional unemployment contribution:




, ti > 0.
(A.11)
To consider the employed contributions, start with the unconditional cumulative distribution
function of wages conditional on agents’ types:
Fe(wi | J, I) = P(W ≤ wi | J, I)
































39 The model without prejudice implies the following ﬂows in and out unemployment:
∂u
∂t
= ηJ(1 − ut) − λJ ˜ G(ρUJ)ut;
therefore, in steady state
ηJ
ηJ + λJ ˜ GJ(ρUJ)
= u = P(i U).780 FLABBI
The corresponding density will be
fe(wi | J, I) =











To move to the conditional density, just recall that the reservation wage for each workers’
type is the same at each employers’ type. Therefore, we get





w + αdI{W,P} − (1 − α)ρUJ
α
 
˜ GJ(ρUJ + dI{W,P})
,w i >ρ UJ, (A.14)
and removing conditioning on employers’ type
fe(wi |wi >ρ UJ,i E, J)















wi + αdI{W} − (1 − α)ρUJ
α
 
˜ GJ(ρUJ + dI{W})
,w i >ρ UJ.
(A.15)
Finally, conditioning only on workers’ type and using ergodic results on ﬂows in and out em-
ployment, we get
fe(wi,w i >ρ UJ,i E| J)

















wi + αdI{W} − (1 − α)ρUJ
α
)







,w i >ρ UJ.
(A.16)
A.5. Welfare Measures. The proposed welfare measures exploit the steady-state equilib-
rium results of the model.40
Insteadystate,workersoccupyallthepossibleequilibriumstates:theunemploymentstateand
the employment state at each acceptable match value x. An average welfare measure should
associate a value at each of these states and then weigh them according to some meaningful
measure. In order to clarify the discussion, deﬁne the following labor market environment
  ≡ (λ,η,ρ,b,α,G(x)). This is the environment that generates the steady-state equilibrium
derived in Section 2. A function that assigns welfare values to states is
T (x) = U [1 − I{x≥x∗}] + W[w(x,U)]I{x≥x∗}, (A.17)
whereU isthevalueofunemployment, W[w(x,U)]isthevalueofemploymentatthewagethat
corresponds to the match value x, and x∗ is the reservation match value. This function assigns
the value of unemployment to all the unemployed individuals (x < x∗) and the value of being
employed at a wage w(x,U) to all the employed individuals (x ≥ x∗).
A meaningful weighting function for T (x) is the ex post distribution of types in the pop-
ulation. Deﬁne with H the corresponding cumulative distribution function; then H(x) =
40 For a discussion and interpretation of this and other welfare measures in the context of a similar search model with
minimum wage, see Flinn (2002b, 2006).GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION 781
H(x|u) P(u) + H(x|e)[1 − P(u)], where u indicates the state of unemployment, e the state














where h = λ ˜ G(x∗) is the hazard rate out of unemployment. The proposed welfare measure is
therefore the average of the value of each state taken over the equilibrium distribution of types.
Formally:
DEFINITION 5. The average welfare measure for workers in an environment   ≡
(λ,η,ρ,b,α,G(x)) is deﬁned as

















This welfare measure is presented for simplicity in an homogenous environment. When het-
erogeneity is introduced, expression (A.18) must be specialized for each type of worker.
For men, in presence of heterogeneity, the average welfare will simply be (A.18) in an en-
vironment equal to  M ≡
   λM,  ηM,ρ,  bM,α,  GM(x)
 
, where the estimated values correspond
to the estimates of speciﬁcation (6) in Table 2. For women, computation of EH [T (x)] under
this speciﬁcation is slightly more complicated, since the differential impact of the two types of
employers must be taken into account. The solution is highly simpliﬁed by the fact that the pro-
portionofprejudicedandunprejudicedemployersisﬁxedanddoesnotdependonx.Therefore,
the welfare measure will simply be a linear combination of two quantities obtained by plugging
in to Equation (A.18) the reservation values and wage schedules of women at the two types of
employers in an environment  W ≡
   λW,  ηW,ρ,  bW,α,  GW(x),  d,  p
 
.
In order to deﬁne employers’ welfare, it is useful to recall the following. The model assumes
search frictions, match speciﬁc productivity, and bargaining. This characterization leads to posi-
tiveproﬁtand,giventheassumptiononpreferences,topositiveutilityforeachtypeofemployer.
A reasonable measure of welfare is then the steady state value of this quantity.
DenotethenumberofworkerswithN,theproportionofmenwithm,thenumberofemployers
with K, and the proportion of prejudiced employers with p. Then, the steady-state number of










where hJI denotes the hazard rate for a type J from being unemployed to being employed at












[x − dI{W} − w(x,UJ,dI{W})]
gJ (x)
˜ GJ (ρUJ + dI{W})
dx.
Followingthepreviousintuition,theproposedwelfaremeasureistheaverageoftheper-worker
utility value times the proportion of that type of workers hired in steady state.
DEFINITION 6. The average welfare measures for employers of types N, P in an environment
  ≡ (λ,η,ρ,b,α,G(x), p,d) are
 N = APMN
EMN
(1 − p) K
+ APWN
EWN
(1 − p) K
,








The focus of interest will be the ratio  P/ N, so missing information on the number of
employers K is innocuous.
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